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When  asked  about  the  most  important  develop: 
ments  in banking  in the  decade  of  the  198Os,  most 
people  are  likely  to  point  to  the  thrift  debacle  or 
to  losses  on  loans  to  less  developed  countries.  But 
arguably  more  influential  has been  a benign  develop- 
ment,  namely,  the  rise of interstate  banking.  In  1980, 
only  Maine  allowed  bank  holding  companies  from 
outside  the  state  to  acquire  Maine  banks.  By  1990, 
all but  four  states  allowed  out-of-state  banks  to enter, 
although  in  many  states  there  were  regional  limita- 
tions  on  entry. 
Also  during  the  198Os,. most  (but  not  all)  states 
relaxed  their  restrictions  on  branch  banking, 
culminating  a century-long  trend  toward  liberaliza- 
tion.  One  hundred  years  ago,  virtually  all banking 
in the  United  States  took  place  through  unit  banks, 
that  is, independent  banks  with  no  branches.  In the 
first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  banks  began  to 
branch  extensively  within  the  cities  in  which  they 
were  headquartered;  by  the  second  half  of  the  cen- 
tury,  statewide  branching  networks  or holding  com- 
panies  had became  the  norm  in many  states.  In  1980, 
twelve  states  prohibited  bank  branching  while twenty- 
one  allowed  statewide  branching.  By  1990,  only  two 
states  prohibited  branching  while the  number  of states 
allowing  statewide  branching  had grown  to thirty-six. 
The  parallel  rapid growth  of interstate  bank  holding 
companies  and  liberalization  of state  branching  laws 
suggest  the  next  step:  interstate  branch  banking. 
While  the  current  practice  of expanding  across  state 
lines  by  acquiring  an  existing  bank  and  making  it a 
subsidiary  of  the  acquiring  company  differs  little  in 
practice  from  branching,  it  does  entail  some  costs 
that  could  be  eliminated  by  allowing  the  acquirer  to 
turn  a bank  into  a branch.  Indeed,  most  bank  holding 
companies  that  have  been  allowed  to consolidate  their 
subsidiaries  within  a state  into  a branch  network  have 
chosen  to do  so.  And  if banks  are  allowed  to  expand 
l The  author  thanks  Gary  Bosco  of  the  Conference  of  State 
Bankine  Suoervisors.  William  E&land  of Morrison  & Foerster. 
and  M&c  dken  of ACNB  Corp.  for  their  helpful  information: 
John  Walter  and  Marc  Morris  provided  research  assistance.  The 
views  in  the  article  are  solely  those  of  the  author  and  do  not 
necessarily  reflect  the  views  of the  Federal  Reserve  Bank of Rich- 
mond  or the  Board  of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
by  setting  up  de  novo  branches  in other  states,  then 
the  potential  for  competition  should  be  enhanced 
even  further. 
This  article  attempts  to  show  that  interstate 
branching,  while not  in demand  in the  past,  is a logical 
and  feasible  step  in the  evolution  of the  geographical 
structure  of American  banking.1  As a preliminary,  it 
describes  the  current  regulatory  environment  with 
regard  to  interstate  branching,  as well  as the  evolu- 
tion  of  attitudes  toward  and  regulation  of  branch 
banking.  Given  this  background,  the  article  outlines 
the  arguments  for  interstate  branching  and  then 
discusses  ways  it  could  be  implemented,  the 
likelihood  of its adoption,  and  its possible  effects  on 
bank  structure  in  the  United  States. 
THECURRENTREGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT  '. 
Unique  among  American  businesses,  banks  in the 
United  States  are  regulated  by  an interrelated  set  of 
state  and  federal  laws  as to  where  they  canconduct 
business.  A bank  may  choose  to be  chartered  by  the 
federal  government,  in  which  case  it  is  called  a 
national  bank  and  supervised  by  the  Comptroller  of 
the  Currency.  Alternatively,  it  may  choose  a state 
charter.  If it chooses  a state  charter  it is supervised 
by  its  state  agency,  as well  as by  either  the  Federal 
Reserve  if the  bank  opts  to  be  a  Federal  Reserve 
System  member,  or  the  Federal.  Deposit  Insurance 
Corporation  if it does  not  choose  Fed  membership. 
But  whether  a  bank  chooses  a  federal  or  a  state 
charter,  its  geographical  expansion  is  effectively 
regulated  by  the  states. 
At  the  state  level,  banks  are  generally  chartered 
to  operate  within  the  state.  In  addition,  most  states 
specifically  forbid  entry  through  branching,  although 
some  states  have  the  option  to  approve  an  out-of- 
state  bank’s establishing  a branch  within  their  borders 
under  specified  conditions.  Specifically,  Montana, 
Nevada,  New  York,  Oregon,  Rhode  Island,  Utah, 
r The  Federal  Reserve  has  recently  gone  on  record  as  sup- 
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(unpublished  survey,  Conference  of State  Banking 
Supervisors,  1990).2 
At  the  federal  level,  the  McFadden  Act  of  1927 
(as  amended  in  1933)  states  that  national  banks: 
may,  with  the  approval  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Cur- 
rency,  establish  and  operate  new  branches  . . . at any point 
within  the  State  in which  said  association  is situated,  if such 
establishment  and  operation  are  at  the  time  authorized  to 
State  banks  by  the  statute  law  of the  State  in  question  by 
language  specifically  granting  such  authority  affirmatively 
and  not  merely  by  implication  or recognition,  and  subject 
to the  restrictions  as to location  imposed  by the  law of the 
State  on  State  banks.  (12  U.S.C.  Section  36(c)) 
In general,  McFadden  gives  national  banks  the  right 
to branch  to the  same  extent  that  state  banks  are per- 
mitted  to  branch.  But  even  if a state  were  to  allow 
interstate  branching  for  state-chartered  banks,  it is 
not  clear  whether  national  banks  could  be  given 
interstate  branching  authority  under  current  law 
because  the  law  contains  the  phrase  “within  the 
State”,  which  would  appear  to  limit  national  banks 
to within  state  boundaries.  Thus  McFadden  is usually 
interpreted  as  prohibiting  interstate  branching  by 
national  banks.3 
Whatever  the  specifics  of how  banks  are restricted 
from  branching  across  state  lines,  virtually  all inter- 
state  bank  expansion  to date  has taken  place  through 
bank  holding  companies.  The  Douglas  Amendment 
to  the  Bank  Holding  Company  Act  of  1956  forbids 
interstate  acquisitions  by  bank  holding  companies 
unless  the  acquired  bank’s  home  state  allows  the 
acquisition.  Under  current  state  interstate  banking 
laws  and  the  Douglas  Amendment,  a bank  holding 
company  now expands  interstate  by acquiring  a bank 
or  bank  holding  company  and  then  operating  it  as 
a  subsidiary  rather  than  a  branch.  For  example,  a 
bank  holding  company  headquartered  in Virginia  and 
engaging  in full-service  banking  in Maryland  and  the 
District  of Columbia  must  under  current  law operate 
through  three  separate  banking  organizations,  one 
for  each  jurisdiction. 
One  prominent  wrinkle  present  in  most  but  not 
all interstate  banking  laws  is a ban  on  expansion  by 
z Massachusetts  allowed  entry  through  branching  in  its  1983 
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3 One  could  also  argue  that  McFadden  was  intended  to  give 
national  banks  branching  parity  with  state  banks.  If so,  federal 
regulators  might  have  the  discretion  to  allow  national  banks  to 
branch  across  state  lines  along with  their  state-chartered  brethren 
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creating  a de novo  subsidiary.  That  is, most  interstate 
banking  statutes  allow entry  only by acquiring  a bank 
that  has  been  in  existence  a  specified  number  of 
years.  It  is  reasonable  to  assume  such  restrictions 
were  necessary  to  secure  the  passage  of  interstate 
banking  laws  by  making  the  laws  more  palatable  to 
potential  acquirees.  Foreclosing  the  option  of de novo 
entry  removed  an alternative  to entry  by acquisition 
and  thereby  raised  premiums  paid  by  entrants  for 
banks.  While  it  is likely  that  most  banks  look  first 
at acquiring  an existing  depository  institution,  block- 
ing  de  novo  entry  means  that  entrants  are  deprived 
of an option  they  might  exercise  if merger  premiums 
seemed  excessive  or if no existing  bank  in an other- 
wise  attractive  market  were  a suitable  candidate  for 
takeover. 
Thrift  institutions  already  have  the  legal authority 
to branch  interstate,  although  the  authority  has been 
restricted  by regulators.  In Indepndent Banken &oci- 
ation of  America  v. Fe&al  Home  Loan Bank Board (55  7 
F.  Supp.  23  (1982)),  the  District  Court  ruled  that 
branching  by federally  chartered  thrifts  comes  under 
the  authority  of the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board 
(now  the  Office  of  Thrift  Supervision),  whether 
intrastate  or  interstate.  The  Independent  Bankers 
challenged  the  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  when  it 
adopted  a doctrine  of allowing  interstate  branching 
to acquire  a troubled  thrift  and then  allowing  branch- 
ing within  the  acquired  thrift’s state.  The  court  made 
clear  that  restrictions  on  interstate  thrift  branching 
are  administrative  rules  and  not  enshrined  in the  law 
as is the  case with  banks.  The  implication  is that  the 
rules  could  be  modified  at  the  discretion  of  the 
Office  of Thrift  Supervision  without  any  change  in 
the  law. 
There  are a few interstate  bank  branches  operating 
today  that  had  been  established  before  either  state 
or  federal  laws  forbade  them.  For  example,  since 
1905  the  Bank  of California  has  operated  branches 
in  Portland,  Oregon,  and  Seattle  and  Tacoma, 
Washington.  All three  were  acquired  from the  British 
bank  that  had  originally  established  them.  In  addi- 
tion,  Midlantic  National  Bank in New Jersey  operates 
a branch  across  the  Delaware  River  in Philadelphia. 
Since  both  Bank  of  California  and  Midlantic  are 
federally  chartered,  there  is no  problem  with  state 
regulatory  authority  over  the  branches.  More  re- 
cently,  after  the  Bank  of America  acquired  a failed 
Arizona  thrift  that  had  operated  a branch  in  Utah, 
the  Utah  banking  regulators  allowed  Bank of America 
to  continue  to  operate  the  office  as  a  branch. 
4  ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1990 There  have  been  other  examples  of  interstate 
branch  banking  (Federal  Reserve  Board  1933a, 
~~207-9).  The  First  and Second  Banks of the United 
States  both  had  branches  during  their  existence. 
Wells  Fargo  and  Company  operated  branches  out- 
side California.  The  branches  were  closed  apparently 
as  the  result  of business  decisions  and  not  of legal 
or  regulatory  actions.  Finally,  in  1874  the  Freed- 
man’s  Savings  and  Trust  Company,  chartered  by 
Congress,  had branches  in all the  Southern  states  and 
one  in New  York  (Chapman  and Westerfield  1942). 
Still,  given  the  number  of  banks  in  the  United 
States,  it  is  striking  to  see  how  little  interstate 
branching  had  occurred  even  before  it was  explicit- 
ly  banned. 
THEORIGINSOFCURRENTLAW 
The  history  of  banking  in  the  United  States  is 
characterized  not  simply  by  the  lack  of  interstate 
branching,  but  by  the  longtime  lack  of  interest  in 
branching  within  a’ state  as  well.  That  is,  while 
branching  has  occurred  throughout  American  bank- 
ing  history,  it  only  caught  on  as  a  widespread 
phenomenon  in  the  twentieth  century,  and  then 
only  in  fits  and  starts.  In  contrast,  the  history  of 
Canadian  banking  has included  branch  banking  from 
the  start  and  there  have  apparently  been  no  serious 
efforts-to  emulate  the  American  system.  And  while 
in Canada  a small number  of commercial  banks  with 
extensive  branch  netwoiks  have  been  able  to  serve 
the  market,  in the  United  States  small  independent 
banks  abound  even  in states  with  no restrictions  on 
branching. 
Before  the  Civil War,  there  was branching  at both 
the  federal  and  stati  levels  (Federal  Reserve  Board 
1933a).  At  the,federal  level,  the  First  Bank  of the 
United  States,  which  lasted  from  1792  to  18 11, was 
headquartered  ifi Philadelphia  and maintained  offices 
in eight-other  cities.  The  Second  Bank  of the  United 
States,  which  lasted  from  18 16  to  1836  and  also 
operated  out  of Philadelphia,  had  as many  as twenty- 
five  other  offices  during  its  life. 
In  addition,  there  were  state  branch  banking 
systems,  although  most  of  the  branches  that  sur- 
vived  into  the  National  Bank  era  after  the  Civil War 
ended  up  incorporating  as  independent  national 
banks.  Finally,  “free  banking”  arose  in the  North  at 
the  same  time  as branch  banking  in other  states.  Free 
banking  meant  that  specific  legislative’ch&tFring  of 
a bank  was  not  required;  instead,  anyone,  meeting 
specified  requirements  (such  us initial  capitalization 
and depositing  bonds  with the  chartering,state)  would 
be issued  a charter.  Free  banks  were  unit. banks;  they 
had  no  branches,  although  branch  banking  was  not 
specifically  forbidden. 
The  last  category,  free  banking,  turned  out  to  be 
significant  for  the  future  of ‘branch  banking  law 
because  the  New  York  free  banking  law  contained 
provisions  specifying  that  “the  usual  business  of 
banking  . .  . shall  be  transacted  at  the  place  where 
such  banking  association  .  .  . shall  be  located  .  .  .” 
(Federal  Reserve  Board  1933a).  The  language  was 
apparently  not  aimed  at branch  banking  per  se,  but 
at the  then  notorious  practice  of issuing  currency  at 
the  bank’s  main  location,  usually  in  a remote  area 
(“wildcat banking”),  but  only redeeming  at a discount 
in  a  city  location.  The  provisions  were  significant 
because  they  were  later  to  be  incorporated  into  the 
National  Banking  Act and  still later  to be interpreted 
as  forbidding  branching  by  national  banks,  even 
though  there  is  no  evidence  that  doing  so  was  the 
original intent  of the legislation  (Fischer  and Golembe 
1976). 
When  the.National  Bank  System  was  established 
at the  efid of the  Civil War,  the new  system  was com- 
prised  entirely  by  unit  banks,  even  though  state- 
chartered  branch  banks  were  sbecifically  allowed  to 
keep  their  branches  if  they  converted  to  national 
charter.  As it turned  out,  the  grandfathering  authority 
for  branches  was  not  used  until  the  first  decade  of 
the  twentieth  centuti.  The  important  point  is that 
branching  was  simply”not  an  important  issue,  not 
because  of specific  opposition  to  it  but  because  of 
lack  of interest.  Apparently  unit  banks  had  a com- 
parative  advantage  over  branch  .banks. 
The  first  stirrings  of  renewed  interest  in  branch 
banking  came  during  the  late  1890s  in  the  form  of 
proposals  to encourage  branching  by national  banks 
as a means  of making  banking  services  available, to 
rural  areas  that  could  not  support  a separately  incor- 
porated  bank  (Comptroller  of the  Currency  1895). 
While such proposals  did not elicit much  interest  from 
the  public,  bankers  were  largely  opposed  so  none 
were  enacted.  Instead,  in the  Currency  Act  of 1900 
the  required  capital  for establishing  a national  bank 
was  reduced  from  $50,000  to  $?5,000  (or,  in  1990 
dollars,  from  $663,500  to $33 1,750)  for towns  with 
population  of  less  than  3,000.4 
4 In  comparison,  in  1990  the  minimum  initial  capital  for  a 
national  bank  was  $50,000  in a town  of less  than  6,000  inhabi- 
tants,  $lQO,OOO for a town  of up  to  50,000,  and  $200,000  for 
a city  of over  50,000  (12 U.S.C.  51).  In practice,  all regulatory 
agencies  have  administratively  adopted  far  higher  minimums. 
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number  of, banks  in the  United  States  from  approx- 
imately  13,000  in  1900  to  about  25,000  in  1910 
(Board  of Governors  1959).  And  of the  new  banks, 
about  two-thirds  were  small  unit  banks  with  an 
average  capital  base  of just  over  $25,000  (Chapman 
and  Westerfield’  1942).  The  resultant  proliferation 
of independent  unit banks  made  for an anti-branching 
force  that  slowed  the  growth  of branch  banking  for 
decades. 
While  the  number  of unit  banks  increased,  branch 
banking  became  more  common  at the  state  level.  In 
California,  branch  banking  started  as a largely  rural 
phenomenon,  especially  after branching  was officially 
approved  for  state  banks  in  1909  (Federal  Reserve 
Board  1933b).  But  in  the  rest  of  the  country, 
branching  became  commonplace  not  in rural  areas 
but  within  cities,  in particular,  in New  York,  Detroit, 
Philadelphia,  Boston,  and  Cleveland. 
As both  branching  by state  banks  and the  number 
of  unit  banks  grew,  it  is  not  surprising  that  unit 
bankers  attempted  to  contain  the  spread  of branch 
banking.  The  result  was,  first,  a flurry  of laws  in the 
1920s  to ban branch  banking,  mostly  in states  where 
it did not  yet  exist.  As shown  in Table  I, more  states 
banned  branching  in  1929 than  had  done  so in  1910. 
Second,  there  were  moves  to  keep  national  banks 
from  branching  at  all,  with  the  avowed  purpose  of 
stemming  the  spread  of branch  bar&i&in  any form. 
National  banks  in  branchgmg  states  wanted  the 
same  branching  privileges  as  their  state-chartered 
brethren.  But unit  banks  were  adamant  in opp.osing 
any extension  of branch  banking.  Further,  the  money 
center  banks  of  the  day  were  largely  opposed  to 
branch  banking,  since  they  stood  to  profit  from 
correspondent  business  and were  not much  interested 
in retail  customers.  And  apparently  absent  from  the 
debate  was  any consideration  of interstate  branching. 
Regulatory  policy  toward  branch  banking  varied 
over  time.  In  19 11, the  Comptroller  requested  that 
the  Attorney  General  issue  an  opinion  regarding 
branching  by national  banks.  Based  on the  language 
originally  adopted  from the  free banking  statutes,  the 
Attorney  General  opined  that  national  banks  were 
not  allowed  to  branch.  But  by  the  early  192Os,  the 
Comptroller  allowed branching  in order  to meet  com- 
petition  by state-chartered  banks  in branching  states. 
Indeed,  one  Comptroller  believed  he  could  allow 
branching  regardless  of  state  laws,  but  simply 
followed  state  laws  as a matter  of policy,  just  as did 
the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  in the  1980s. 
Table  I 
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6  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1990 Finally,  in  1924  in Fint  National Bank in St.  L&s 
w.  State of Missouri (263  U.S.  640),  the  Supreme 
Court  held  that  a state  had  the  right  to  enforce  its 
branching  restrictions  for national  banks  unless  Con- 
gress  specifically  said otherwise.  The  Court  also held 
that  national  banks  did not  have  the  right  to branch. 
The  matter  was put  to’rest  by the  McFadden  Act 
of  1927,  passed  after  three  years  of intense  debate. 
The  Act  allowed  a  national  bank  to  branch  within 
its  city  boundaries  if state  banks  were  allowed  the 
same  or more  liberal privileges.  Since most  branching 
at the  time  was  within  cities,  the  Act  probably  was 
sufficient  for  most  ‘banks.  But  in  California,  the 
restrictions  were  binding  on  national  banks  so they 
led to forms  of corporate  organization  and  affiliation 
that  served  to  evade  the  Act’s  restrictions  (Federal 
Reserve  Board  1933b). 
the  1980s.  Table  I- shows  how  the  laws  have 
changed  over  time  for the  individual  states;  In  1939, 
eighteen  states  allowed  statewide  branching  while 
nine  allowed  only  unit  banks.  By  1979,  the  number 
of states  allowing statewide  branching  and the number 
allowing  only unit  banking  had  both  grown  by three. 
As  of  1990,.  thirty-six  states  allowed  statewide 
branching  while only two states  prohibited  branching 
altogether.  But as mentioned  earlier,  by this  time  all 
but  four states  had enacted  laws permitting  interstate 
expansion  by  holding  company  acquisitions.  Thus 
the  question  is no’ longer  whether  banks  should  be 
allowed  to expand  interstate,  but  rather  whether  they 
should  be  allowed  to  do  so  by  branching. 
ADVANTAGESOF 
INTERSTATEBRANCHBANKING 
Following  the  McFadden  Act,  anti-branching  senti- 
ment  waned,  largely  because  the  extensive  bank 
failures  of  the  ‘late  1920s  and  early  1930s  showed 
the  weakness  of unit  banking  ,and made  branching 
attractive  as  a means  of making  failures  less  likely. 
As Table  I shows,  the  consequence  was that  between 
1929  and  1939  the  number  of  states  prohibiting 
branches  fell  sharply  while  the  number  permitting 
statewide  branching  doubled. 
Safety 
I 
While the ultimate  result  of the rash of bank  failures 
was  deposit  insurance  rather  than  significantly 
enhanced  branching  powers  (Fischer  and  Golembe 
1976),  there  arose,during  this  time  the  first  explicit 
support  for interstate  branching.  Senator  Carter  Glass 
of Virginia,  an architect  of the  Federal  Reserve  Act, 
proposed  in  1932  a bill that  would  liberalize  national 
bank  branching  powers.  In  particular,  the  bill  pro- 
posed  not  simply  statewide  branching  for  national 
banks  but  “trade  area”  branching  as  well.  That  is, 
a bank  located  near  a state  line with frequent  business 
in the  other  state  would  be  allowed  to branch  up  to 
fifty miles into the  state.  An obvious  example  of such 
a trade  area  is the  Washington,  D.C..,  metropolitan 
area. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  banking  system, 
interstate  branching  would  be  .beneficial  in  that  it 
would  enhance  safety.  In general,  the historical  record 
supports  the assertion  that,branch  banks  have a better 
safety  record  than  unit  banks.  In  particular,  during 
the  1920s  and  early  1930s  the  failure  rate  was  in- 
versely  related  to  bank  size  (Cartinhour  1931; 
Chapman  and Westerfield  1942).  Further,  during  the 
period  192 1-3 1,  the  failure  rate  as  a percentage  of 
banks  operating  at  the  end  of  1931  was  46.5  per- 
cent  for  all banks  but  only  26.4  percent  for  banks 
with  branches  (Federal  Reserve’  Board  1933a, 
1933~).  But  the  comparison  understates  the  differ- 
ence  since  the  majority  of branch  banks  that  failed 
had  only  one  branch.  For  banks  with  over  ten 
branches,  the  failure  rate.  was  only  12.5  percent 
(Federal  Reserve  Board’  1933a). 
The  Glass  Bill was not  enacted.  Instead,  the  Bank- 
ing Act  of 1933  (better  known  as the  Glass-Steagall 
Act)  liberalized  the  1927  McFadden.  provisions  to 
permit  national  banks  to branch  to  the  same  extent 
as was  permitted  to  state  banks.  Thus  national  and 
state  banks  had  approximately  the  same  branching 
powers,  and  the  law  remains  in  force  today. 
There  are  several  related  reasons  for  the  better 
safety  record  of branch  banks,  reasons  that  apply  b 
&&ti  to  interstate  branching.  First,  .by  its’ very 
nature,  a system  of small  unit  banks  is more  prone 
to  insolvencies  if funds  move  out  of a troubled  unit 
bank  serving  an area  than  would  a system  of branch 
banks  in  which  funds  simply  flowed  out  of  a 
troubled  branch  serving  the  same  area  (Greenspan 
1990).  That  is, events  that  for a unit bank  would  lead 
to insolvency  might  simply  lead to a loss for a branch 
serving  the  same  area.  Second,  runs  are more  likely 
in  a  system  of  small  banks,  since  small,  localized 
shocks  are  more  likely  to  be  perceived  as threaten- 
ing  entire  institutions  (Calomiris  1990). 
Since  1933,  virtually  all  the  action  on  branch  ‘The  first two  reasons  for branch  banking’s  greater 
banking  has occurred  at the  state  level,  although  most  safety  imply  the  third:  geographical  diversification. 
changes  since  the  Depression  era  occurred  during  By making  it less  costly.for  banks  to  expand  across 
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sible  for  them  to  diversify  their. loan :portfolios  to  a 
greater  extent  than  is  now  possible.  B,anks  would 
consequently  be  less  subject  to  swings  in  regional 
economies  such  as agricultural  failures  or declines  in 
regional  industries,  so what  could  mean  insolvency 
for .a  geographically  restricted  set  of  banks  might 
mean  only  losses  for  one  part  of  a  geographically 
diversified  bank.  A -fourth  reason  for  greater  safety 
is that  a branch  bank  in essence.serves  as a m,utual 
loss  sharing,arrangement  under  which  losses  to one 
part  of  a  bank’s  operation  are  ,diffused ‘across  the 
entire  organization.  Again,  geographically  limited 
losses  that  for  a geographically  limited  bank  might 
mean  insolvency  could  be  more  easily  absorbed  by 
a  larger,  geographically  dispersed.  organization. 
:_  ‘. 
Finally,  interstate  branching  would  make  it  less 
costly  to  gather  core  deposits,  which  by  definition 
are  a  more  stable  funding  source  than.  purchased 
funds.  Despite  their  stated.  maturity  of  zero,  core 
deposits  can have  effective  maturities  of several  years 
(Flannery  and  James  1984).,  So  by  making  core 
deposits  cheaper,  relative  to purchased  funds,  inter- 
state  branching  ,could  help  increase  the  duration  of 
a  bank’s  li.ability  side  so  the.  bank  would  be. less 
vulnerable  to  interest  rate  swings  than  if  it  relied 
heavily  -on ,purchased  funds. 
There  would  be  an incidental  safety  benefit  to in- 
terstate  branching.  The  Federal  Reserve  has  pro- 
mulgated  the  “source  of. strength”  doctrine,  which 
calls upon  a bank  holding  company  to support  its sub- 
sidiary  banks  in times  of .adversity.  There  have  been 
recent  cases  in which  a bank  holding  company,  when 
looked  at as a consolidated  entity,  was insolvent  even 
though  ,some  subsidiary  banks  were  technically  sol- 
vent  on  their  own  (MCo+ v.  Board of Gbvernorx  of 
the Federal Reseme S’steni, No.  89-28 16, ‘5th  Cir., 
May  15,  1990).  Problems  arose  because  of disagree- 
ments  as  to  the  legal  obligations  between  a  bank 
holding  company  and  its  subsidiary  banks,  each  of 
which  was  a  distinct  legal  ‘entity. 
If the  entities  involved  had  been  branches  rather 
than-  subsidiaries,  such  problems  might  not  have 
arisen  (unless  assets  had  been  moved  into  nonbank 
subsidiaries).  While  in the  case  of MCorp  the  reason 
for  the  separate  subsidiary  banks  was  state  law  and 
not  the  McFadden  Act,  the  case  does  serve  to illus- 
trate  the  problems  that  can  arise  with  organizations 
comprised  by  separately  chartered  banks.  If in the 
future  an  interstate,bank  holding  company  were  to 
face  insolvency,  disputes  such  as those  arising  with 
MCorp  would  be far less likely if regulators  were  deal- 
ing  with  one  consolidated  bank  rather  than  a web 
of  subsidiary  banks. 
Consumer  .Benefits 
From  the  point  of view  of the  consumer,  a major 
advantage  of  interstate  branching  over  the  current 
system  would  be convenience.  For  example,  suppose 
a bank  holding  company  has subsidiary  banks  in, say, 
Virginia  and  Washington,  D.C.  A customer  with  an 
account  at the Virginia bank  might  be allowed  to cash 
a check  at an office of the  Washington  bank,  but  not 
to make  a deposit.  That  is, full service  banking  across 
state  lines  simply  does  not  yet  exist.  In  contrast,  if 
the  subsidiaries  were  branches  a customer  could  do 
at an out-of-state  branch  everything  she  could  do  at 
a  branch  in  her  own  state. 
In  addition,  an  interstate  branch  network  would 
be  beneficial  to  travelers  needing  cash  and  banking 
services.  While  such  innovations  as travelers’  checks 
and  credit  cards  have  developed  to lessen  the  ineffi- 
ciencies  associated  with  the  current  banking  system, 
the  availability  of banking  services  over  a wider  area 
would  add  to  the  traveler’s  options.  Finally,  by 
adding  to  the  number  of banks  able  to  branch  into 
a  market,  interstate  branching  might  increase  the 
accessibility  of banking  services.  Just  as  statewide 
branching  .has made  banking  services  more  available 
to  consumers  than  under  unit  banking,  so  should 
interstate  branching  compared  with  the  current 
balkanized  system  (Evanoff  1988). 
Efficiency  ? 
From  the  point  of  view  of-a  bank  interested  in 
. 
operating~interstate,  a major  argument  for  allowing 
interstate  branching  is efficiency.  Under  the  current 
system,of  allowing  interstate  expansion  only  through 
bank  holding  company  subsidiaries,  a  bank  must 
incur  parallel  costs  in each  state  in which  it chooses 
to operate.  First,  each  subsidiary  must  have  a separate 
board  of directors  as well  as committees  associated 
with  each  board.  Second,  each  subsidiary  must 
submit  separate  regulatory  reports  (for example,  call 
reports)  and  undergo  separate  examinations.  Third, 
each  subsidiary  must  submit  its  own  audited  finan- 
cial  statement.  Fourth,  each, subsidiary  requires  its 
own  support  and control  functions,  for example,  per- 
sonnel,  budget,  audit,’  and  accounting,  that  for  a 
branch.network  could  be consolidated.  Finally,  each 
subsidiary  will  maintain  its  own  computer  systems 
and  applications  for  such  tasks  as  demand  deposit 
accounting,  loans,  and  reserves.  Even  if the, bank 
holding  company  is managed  as if it were  one  bank, 
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rately  prevents  the  systems  from  being  integrated 
completely. 
Duplication  is  not  the  only  source  of  costs  in  a 
network  of subsidiaries.  Each  subsidiary  will have  to 
satisfy  capital  requirements,  so  there  are  costs 
associated  with  the  complex  treasury  exercise  of 
balancing  capital  between  the  subsidiaries.  Further, 
costs  incurred  by  the  parent  company  must  be 
allocated  among  the  subsidiaries,  even  though  there 
may be no economically  meaningful  way of allocating 
such  costs.  That  is, certain  costs  originating  in,  say, 
the  lead  bank  for  the  benefit  of  the  subsidiaries 
cannot  be assigned  to the  subsidiaries  except  by some 
unavoidably  arbitrary  method.  Finally,  since  each 
subsidiary  is  a  separately  chartered  bank,  moving 
assets  between  entities  must  take  place  on an “arm’s 
length”  basis,  meaning  that  internal  transfers  must 
be  treated  as  if the  subs  were  not  united  by  com- 
mon  ownership.  As  a  result,  internal  transactions 
might  have  tax  considerations  and  other  costs  that 
would  not  arise if the  subsidiaries’were  consolidated. 
Despite  the  costs  of  maintaining  separate  sub- 
sidiaries,  a bank  holding  company  choosing  to  con- 
solidate  will lose  at least  four benefits  of separation. 
First,  boards  of directors  can be  a source  of referrals 
for loans  and other  business  for a bank  in a local area, 
a source  that  would  be  lost  if subsidiaries  were  con- 
verted  to branches.  Second,  if a bank  holding  com- 
pany  purchases  a bank  that  had  served  an area  com- 
petently  and profitably  for years,  the  company  might 
prefer  to  preserve  the  “brand  name  capital”  of the 
acquired  bank  by  letting  it  operate  as  a subsidiary 
under  its  old  identity  instead  of under  the  name  of 
the  acquirer.  Third,  unlike  their  Canadian  counter- 
parts,  American  bankers  do  not  have  experience  in 
managing  far-flung  branch  networks,  so  decentral- 
ized  management  might  compensate  for  this  lack. 
The  problem  should  lessen  over  time,  however, 
as  bank  holding  companies  develop  experience  in 
interstate  operations  and  develop  the  ability  to 
centrally  manage  more  geographically  dispersed 
branch  networks. 
Finally,  a bank  holding  company  might  stay decen- 
tralized  to  preserve  the  benefit  of  tiered  reserve 
requirements.  When  calculating  the  reserves  a bank 
is required  to  maintain  on its transactions  accounts, 
the  required  ratio  of  reserve  balances  to  deposits 
increases  as  follows:  The  first  $3.4  million  of  its 
transactions  accounts  is  exempt  ‘from  any  require- 
ments;  the  required  ratio is 3 percent  for $3.5  million 
to  $40.4.  million  of  transactions  accounts;  and  the 
ratio  is  12  percent  for  all  remaining  transactions 
accounts  over  $40.5  million  (FederalReserve  Bdletitz, 
August  1990).  Since  the  cost  of  reserves  is  the 
foregone  interest  on the  funds,  a bank  holding  com- 
pany  could  hold  down  its  required  reserves  by  ex- 
panding  by  means  of small  subsidiaries  rather  than 
branches. 
Thus  there  is a tradeoff  between  costs  and benefits 
of maintaining  separate  subsidiaries.  As a decentral- 
ized  bank  holding  company  growsand  expands  the 
number  of subsidiaries,  one  would  expect  the  costs 
of decentralization  enumerated  above  to rise.  At the 
same  time;  at  least  one  benefit,  the  lower  amount 
of interest  foregone  on reserves,  becomes  less signifi- 
cant  to a banking  organization  as it grows  larger.  For 
example,  the  deposits  subject  to  the  lower  require- 
ments  would  be  4 percent  of assets  for  a bank  with 
assets  of $1 billion  but  only  0.4  percent  of assets  for 
a bank  with  assets  of $10  billion.  Thus,  other  things 
equal  one  would  expect  consolidation  to  become 
more  likely  as  an  organization  increases  in  size. 
Payment  Processing 
One  of the  most  obvious  places  for improvements. 
in  efficiency  lies  in  the  payment  system  area.  For 
example,  consolidating  a set  of holding  companies 
into  a branch  network  would  increase  the  number 
of “on-us” checks,  that  is, checks  for which  the  payer 
and  payee  both  hold  accounts  in the  same  bank.  If 
so,  then  more  clearing  could  take  place  internally 
(Berger  and  Humphrey  1988).  In addition,  convert- 
ing  interstate  subsidiaries  will  enable  a  bank  to 
consolidate  the  reserve  accounts  of its  subsidiaries 
into  one  account.  Since  banks  use  reserve  accounts 
to  clear  payments,  there  would  be  lower  adminis- 
trative  costs  associated  with  payment  processing. 
Indeed,  even  under  the  current  system  some  bank 
holding  companies  have  chosen  to  process  all their 
Fedwire  payments  through  one  account  regardless 
of which  state  subsidiary  they  involve.  Such  a prac- 
tice would  likely  become  automatic  under  interstate 
branching. 
Competition  and  Credit  Availability 
From  the  point  of view  of  both  banks  and  con- 
sumers,  a major  result  of interstate  branching  would 
be  increased  competition,  especially  if banks  could 
branch  de novo.  Since  allowing  interstate  branching 
would  make  it  less  costly  to. enter  a  state,  banks  a 
would  be  more  likely  to  enter  to  take  advantage  of  I, 
profitable  lending  opportunities.  This  would  have  at 
least  two effects.  First,  it would  increase  the  number 
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Second,  it  could.  make  more  and  cheaper  credit 
available  to  a .market.  ’  ’  . 
.> 
With.regard  to availability  of credit,‘opponents  of 
interstate  branching  (and  for .that  matter  of. branch- 
ing  in any  form)  repeatedly  point  to  the  ppssibility 
that  branch  managers  are  less  concerned  with  the 
local economy  than  are  owners  and  managers,  of the 
bank,  so a branch  would  simply  siphon  funds  out  of 
an  area  to  be  lent  elsewhere.  Rut  such  possibilities 
already  exist,  for ,banks,  as  well  as  branches.  For 
example,  a bank  not  wishing  to lend  in an area  could 
sell federal  fundsupstream  to a correspondent  b,ank, 
or could put  its funds into investment  securities  rather 
than  loans. 
_  Further,  .a branch,  that  ignores  profitable  lending 
opportunities  will be vulnerable  to competition-from 
local institutions.  Finally,  the  argument  that  branches 
suck  credit  out, of  a’ region  .is  a  two-edged  sword: 
The  ability  to draw.‘credit  out  of an area  imfilies  the 
ability  to inject  credit  into.an  area,  so branches  may 
be  as  likely  to  bring  funds  into  an  area  as  to  take 
them  out.  But  regardless  of whether  objections  ‘to 
branching  on. the  basis  of credit  availability  have  any 
validity,. such  problems,  to the  extent  they  exists can 
be .more  directly  attacked,  through-  the  Community 
Reinvestment  Act  than  through  branching  statutes. 
.,  ,,  .” 
~M~DELSOF~,INT~~RSTATEBANKII$G  : 
The  United  States  follows’s  dual~banking  system; 
which  means  that  banks  may’be  chartered  either 
federally  or  by  the  states:  When  developing  a plan 
for  interstate  branching,-  one’.must  be  cognizant  ‘of 
the  interaction  of  state  and’federal  laws  regarding 
banking  structure;  The  following.paragraphs  describe 
three  possible  means  of  implementing  interstate 
branching. 
.,  .’ 
National  Bank  Branching 
Interstate  branching  could  be  instituted  by 
simply  allowing  federally  chartered  banks  to establish 
branches  without  regard  to  the  laws  of the  states  in 
which  the  branches  would  be  located.  That  is,  the 
national  bank  system  would  become  a national  bank- 
ing  system  in-the- sense, of a nationwide  system  and 
not  simply  a federally  chartered  one.  Such  a system 
could  be  put.into  place  by  repealing  the  McFadden 
Act and changing  the  language  of current  law to grant 
a national  bank  the  authority  to  establish  branches 
freely without  regard  to state  laws. The  main.require- 
ment  would  be  specific  Congressional  authorization. 
The  advantage  of using  the  national-bank  system 
to  bring  about  interstate  branching  is that  it would 
be relatively  simple.  That  is, it could be accomplished 
through  federal  legislation  and would  not require  con- 
sent  at  the  individual  state  level.  Further,  the  ap- 
proach  would  not  involve  overlapping  or conflicting 
regulatory  agencies,  ,since  all  national  banks  are 
supervised  by. the  Office  of the  Comptroller  of the 
Currency.  Such  a .system  is  already  in. place  in 
Canada,  where’bank  chartering  and  regulation  have 
been  federal  functions  since  the  British  North 
America.Act  .of  1867. 
The,  disadvantage  of the  national  bank  approach 
to  interstate  branching  is  that  it  would  put  state- 
chartered’  banks  at  a  competitive  disadvantage  to 
national  banks,  at  least  in  those  states  that  do  not 
grant  interstate  branching  privileges  to state-chartered 
banks.  Within  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  there 
would  be  an  additional  problem:  All national  banks 
are  members  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  but 
state-chartered  banks.mayelect  to join. or not  to join 
the  System.  In  a  system  of  unlimited  interstate 
branching  by  national  banks,  there  would  be  a dis- 
parity  between  the powers  of national  banks  and state 
member  banks.  Of course,  there  would  be  a simple 
solution:  States  could  grant  interstate  ‘branching 
powers  to  the  banks  they  charter. 
I  .,  _.  : 
Host-State  Regulation 
: 
The  .first  alternative,  concerns  itself.  only  with 
national  banks,  and  in  effect,  overrides  any  state 
powers  over  national  bank  expansion.  An alternative 
that  preserves  the  authority.of  the  states  would  be 
to permit  state-chartered  banks  to branch  interstate 
provided  they  abide  by  the  regulations  of the  state 
into  which  the  bank  wishes  to expand.  Such  an alter- 
native  would  most  likely  retain  state  authority  over 
bank  ‘structure  by  allowing. national  banks  .to  enter 
a  state  only  if the  state  ,consents.  . 
.,  ,Utah  in  effect  agreed  to  a  scheme  of host-state 
regulation  when,  as  previously  mentioned,  it  per- 
mitted  a state-chartered  bank  in Arizona.to  maintain 
a  Utah  office  as  a  branch.  The  Arizona  bank  had 
previously  been  a thrift,  which  was  taken  over  by 
the  Resolution  Trust  Corporation,  then  purchased 
by  BankAmerica  Corp.,  and.  then.  converted  to  a 
state-chartered  commercial  bank  (American  Banker, 
July  12,  1990).  Consistent  with  thrifts’  more  liberal 
interstate  branching  powers,  the  thrift  had  operated 
a branch  in Utah.  When.BankAmerica  converted  the 
thrift  to  a.bank,  however,  it-  had  to  seek  permission 
from  Utah  to  continue  to ,operate  the  office. as  a 
10  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1990 branch  instead  of  convert  it  to  a  subsidiary.  Utah 
assented,  and  under  the  agreement  Utah  will  be 
responsible  for  examining  the  branch  (American 
Banker, September  4,  1990). 
Leggett  (1989)  has  put  forward  a more  compre- 
hensive  proposal  involving  host-state  regulation  of 
interstate  branching.  The  proposal  would  allow bank 
holding  companies  with interstate  subsidiaries  to con- 
solidate  their  banks  as  branches.  It  belongs  in  the 
host-state  taxonomy  because  a  branch  of  a  state- 
chartered  bank  could  not  exercise  any powers  in the 
host  state  that  were  not  granted  to  banks  chartered 
in that  state,  although  the  proposal  also provides  that 
the  out-of-state  branch  could  not exercise  any powers 
not  granted  by its home  state.  While  the  state  bank’s 
own  regulators  would  examine  the  entire  bank,  they 
would  be  required  to apply  the  host  state’s  laws and 
standards  for out-of-state  branching  applications.  In 
order  to  ensure  that  such  laws  and  standards  are 
followed,  the  host-state  regulator  would  have  the 
authority  to  approve  or  disapprove  applications  for 
entry. 
There  has  been  legislation  recently  introduced  in 
Congress  that  follows  the  host-state  regulation  prin- 
ciple  (H.R.  5384  and  S.  2922).  The  bills  would 
(1)  repeal  the  Douglas  Amendment  to  the  Bank 
Holding  Company  Act;  (2)  amend  the  Federal 
Deposit  Insurance  Act  to  specifically  authorize  out- 
of-state  branches  unless  a state  specifically  forbids 
them;  and  (3)  amend  McFadden  to  allow establish- 
ment  by  national  banks  of  out-of-state  branches 
unless  a  state  specifically  forbids  it  as  in  (2).  The 
activities  allowed  the  branch  would  be  governed  by 
host-state  law. 
Since  states  would  have  the  opportunity  to  pass 
laws  that  block  interstate  branching,  it is not  clear 
how  far  such  a  bill  would  go  toward  facilitating 
nationwide  branch  systems.  Still,  two  points  are 
significant.  First,  by repealing  Douglas  the  bill would 
permit  nationwide  interstate  banking  by the  holding 
company  acquisition  route,  as well  as  eliminate  all 
geographical  restrictions  on  interstate  entry.  That 
alone  is  the  most  extensive  nationwide  banking 
initiative  to arise  at the  federal  level to date.  Second, 
states  would  only  be  able  to  opt  out  of permitting 
interstate  branching. And  since  states  would  be 
required  to specifically pass  laws that  forbid  interstate 
branching  rather  than  laws that  permit  it, branching 
would  be  allowed  if a  state  simply  did  nothing. 
Home-State  Regulation 
A  third  alternative  for  interstate  branch  banking 
is  based  on  an  analogy  with  the  European  Com- 
munity’s  Second  Banking  Directive,  to  take  effect 
at  the  end  of  1992  (Golembe  1989,199O).  The 
effect  of  the  Directive  will  be  to  create  a  “single 
banking  license”  for  a depository  institution  in  any 
European  Community  nation  to provide  banking  ser- 
vices.  The  license  is  based  on  two  concepts.  The 
first  is mutual  recognition  by  each  member  country 
that  every  other  country’s  laws  and  regulations  are 
equal  to its own  and  that  no country  will use  its laws 
and  regulations  to restrict  access  to its market.  The 
second  is home  country  control,  so even  if laws  and 
regulations  differ  between  countries,  those  of  the 
home  country  will govern  the  operations  of a branch 
in another  country  (Key  1989).  In certain  areas  such 
as  consumer  protection,  however,  host-state  regu- 
lators  retain  authority. 
As  applied  to  the  United  States,  the  European 
Community  approach  would  involve  authorizing  a 
bank  chartered  in one  state  to branch  into  any  other 
state.  Whatever  the  host  state’s  laws,  the  branch 
would  be governed  by the  laws of the  state  in which 
the  parent  bank  is  located.  Thus  within  such  a 
framework,  a bank  located  in a state  with  statewide 
branching  would  be  able  to  expand  into  a  limited 
branching  state  but  still branch  throughout  the  state 
regardless  of what  the  local  banks  could  do.  And  to 
take  the  analogy  further,  if a bank  located  in a state 
that  permits  banks  to  sell  life  insurance  branches 
into  a state  that  does  not,  the  branch  would  be  able 
to  exercise  the  more  liberal  insurance  powers  even 
within  the  restrictive  state’s  boundaries. 
There  are  advantages  to  both  the  host-state  and 
home-state  regulation  alternatives.  Given  the  dual 
banking  tradition  of  the  United  States,  host-state 
regulation  is likely  to  be  more  consistent  with  cur- 
rent  practice.  That  is,  by  deferring  to  host  states  it 
is  less  likely  that  states  would  oppose  entry  from 
another  state  than  if control  over  the  branch  were 
to lie entirely  in the  home  state.  Further,  even  if host- 
state  regulation  were  the  norm,  there  would  be  no 
reason  why  host  states  could  not  agree  to  defer  in 
specific  cases  to  home  state  regulators.  In  such  an 
environment,  host  states  would have the option  rather 
than  the  obligation  to accept  another  state’s  laws and 
regulations. 
Home-state  regulation  would  probably  lead  the 
laws and  regulations  of the  various  states  to become 
more  similar  and  consistent.  Since  banks  in  a  re- 
strictive  state  would  be  at a disadvantage  relative  to 
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arise pressure  in the  more  restrictive  states  to loosen 
the  rules.  In  the  European  Community,  such  a 
tendency  toward  “regulatory  convergence”  is  fully 
expected  to  occur  and  is consistent  with  the  goal  of 
“harmonization”  of rules,  regulations,  and  standards 
between  member  countries  (Key  1989). 
Depending  on  one’s  views  concerning  the  dual 
banking  system,  regulatory  convergence  may  or may 
not  be  an  advantage.  If one  believes  that  an  advan- 
tage  of the  American  dual  banking  system  is that  it 
fosters  diversity  and allows some  states  to experiment 
while  others  are  more  conservative,  then  regulatory 
convergence  might  be  less  attractive  than  it would 
be  to  one  who  considers  the  tension  between  state 
and  federal  regulation  to be  an obstacle  to progress. 
More  important,  while  convergence  toward  liberal 
branching  laws  among  states  would  have  salutary 
effects  on  safety,  convergence  toward,  say,  liberal 
real  estate  investment  laws  for  banks  might  not. 
INCENTIVESTOPERMIT 
INTERSTATEBRANCHBANKING 
Having  presented  the  case  for interstate  branching 
and  outlined  three  ways  it could  be  structured,  the 
next  matter  for  consideration  is the  likelihood  of its 
adoption.  As  mentioned  previously,  many  of  the 
benefits  of interstate  branching  will  accrue  to  con- 
sumers  in the  form  of convenience,  increased  com- 
petition  for  deposits,  and  more  efficient  payment 
clearing.  But consumers  are by their  nature  a’diverse 
and  unorganized  group,  and  the  benefits  to  any  in- 
dividual  consumer  are  not  likely  to be  so large  as to 
excite  him  to  lobby  his  state  legislature  to  allow 
interstate  bank  subsidiaries  to  convert  to  branches. 
And  while  the  experience  of Utah  in allowing  an out- 
of-state  thrift  branch  to operate  in the  state  as a bank 
branch  suggests  that  sales  of insolvent  thrift  institu- 
tions  might  require  some  loosening  by  states  of 
restraints  on  entry  by  branching,  it is not  clear  that 
such  liberalization  would  be  necessary  in most  states. 
Thus  it  is  logical  to  ask:  Whence  will  come  the 
pressure  for  interstate  branching? 
As described  earlier,  interstate  branching  would  be 
more  efficient  than  maintaining  separate  subsidiaries. 
Banks  with  interstate  operations  might  therefore  be 
expected  to support  permitting  interstate  branching. 
But  because  it would  make  it less  costly  for  a bank 
to move  across a state  line, interstate  branching  would 
likely  increase  the  number  of potential  competitors 
in a market.  Consequently,  other  (and probably  most) 
banks  at  the  state  level  might  have  incentives  to 
oppose  interstate  branching,  or at least to refrain from 
actively  supporting  it. 
Further,  competition  could  be  even  more  intense 
if de  novo  interstate  branching  were  permitted,  since 
banks  that  are  now  deterred  on  the  margin  from 
expansion  into  another  state  by the  merger  premium 
cost  of acquiring  a bank  might  find  it less  costly  to 
enter  a  state  by  establishing  a  new  branch.  In  the 
past,  interstate  banking  laws  have  been  crafted  in a 
way that  limits competition.  In particular,  most  states 
restrict  de  novo  entry  in  favor  of entry  by  acquisi- 
tion,  which  tends  to make  merger  premiums  higher 
than  would  be  the  case  were  the  de  novo  option 
available.  Thus  potential  acquirees  might  have 
reasons  to oppose  permitting  alternatives  to entry  by 
acquisition. 
The  lineup  of potential  winners  and  losers  from 
interstate  branching  brings  to mind  the  long  opposi- 
tion  by  unit  bankers  to  branching  within  a state.  In 
particular,  it illustrates  Anthony  Downs’s  (1957)  prin- 
ciple  that  when  a small  group  has  much  to gain  and 
a far larger  group  has  about  the  same  amount  to lose 
from  a specific  measure,  the  gainers  have  the  incen- 
tive  to devote  more  resources  to having  the  measure 
enacted  than  would  the  losers,  each  of which  would 
stand  to lose a small amount  as individuals.  The  same 
idea  was  expressed  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
(1933a): 
That  the  opposition  of the  bankers  should  have  been  over- 
whelming,  in the  absence  of any real public  interest  in favor 
of  branch  banking,  is  not  strange.  Nor  is  it  strange  the 
bankers,  pursuing,  as in the  main  they  were,  a thriving  and 
profitable  business,  should  have  been  more  moved  by  the 
probability  that  branching  would  affect  them  individually 
than  by the  possibility  that  the  economic  system  as a whole 
would  profit  from  it. 
With  regard  to  interstate  branching  today,  the 
question  is whether  there  exist  the  same  incentives 
to  fight  it as there  were  to  fight  branching  within  a 
state  in  the  first  decades  of  this  century. 
At first glance,  one  might  be  pessimistic  regarding 
the  chances  for  interstate  branching  because  of the 
relative  influence  of interstate  and  in-state  banks  on 
the  state  legislature.  That  is, in states  with  both  types 
of banks,  both  will have  influence  on the  legislature, 
and  reform  may  in  such  a  state  originate  in  state 
legislation.  But in states  with  banks  that  are not  likely 
to expand  into  other  states,  legislative  pressure  might 
more  likely  be  for  protection  rather  than  enhanced 
entry.  Consequently,  it might  seem  improbable  that 
any large-scale  initiative  for interstate  branching  could 
originate  at  the  state  level. 
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interstate  banking  laws, that  is, those  that  allow bank 
holding  company  expansion  across  state  lines,  did 
originate  at the  state  level.  While  the  prevalence  of 
laws  that  block  de  novo  entry  probably  reflects  the 
incentives  of  potential  acquirees  to  protect  their 
interests,  banks  apparently  did  not  see  fit to devote 
a great  deal  of resources  to blocking  interstate  bank- 
ing  in toto.  Thus  the  success  of efforts  to introduce 
interstate  banking  suggests  that  incentives  to oppose 
interstate  branching  are  not  as strong  today  as were 
the  incentives  in  the  1920s  to  oppose  branching. 
Whatever  the  interplay  of  interests  at  the  state 
level,  the  incentives  might  well  be  different  at  the 
federal  level. While  both  regional  interstate  banks  and 
those  seeking  to  limit  competition  are  well- 
represented,  the  balance  is  probably  less  tilted  in 
favor  of protection.  In  addition,  the  banking  com- 
mittees  of both  the  House  and  Senate  are  by  their 
nature  more  likely  to  reflect  a national  perspective 
than  that  of  individual  state  interests,  so  public 
interest  arguments  might  get  a  more  sympathetic 
hearing.  Finally,  consumer  interests  (such  as  they 
exist)  may  be  better  represented  at the  federal  level 
than  in  the  legislatures  of  fifty  states. 
The  upshot  of  incentives  at  both  the  state  and 
federal  levels  seems  to  be  as follows.  It  is probably 
more  likely  that  interstate  branching  would  be 
approved  at the  federal  level  than  in the  legislatures 
of  all fifty  states.  Further,  if Congress  follows  the 
H.R.  5384  approach  of  authorizing  interstate 
branching  unless  states  pass  legislation  specifically 
&-bidding  it,  the  result  is  likely  to  be  interstate 
branching  in  more  states  than  if it were  left  to  the 
states  to  pass  laws  specifically  awiocizing  it.  The 
reason  is that  it is easier  for either  side to block  legis- 
lation  than  to  get  it  passed,  since  a  law  can  be 
bottled  up  or  killed  in  committee  without  ever 
getting  it  up  for  a vote. 
There  is some  probability  that  branching  laws  in 
the  United  States  could  be  liberalized  in  response 
to  the  developments  in  the  European  Community 
cited  above.  Prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Second 
Banking  Directive,  there  was  some  sentiment  in 
the  European  Community  in  favor  of  adopting 
reciprocity,  under  which  American  banks  would  be 
allowed  to do in the  European  Community  whatever 
European  Community  banks  could  do  in America. 
American  banks  preferred  national  treatment,  under 
which  American  banks  could  do in Europe  whatever 
European  Community  banks  were  allowed  to  do 
there  (and  similarly  for  EC  banks  in  America).  If 
reciprocity  had been  adopted,  American  banks  might 
have  come  under  severe  restrictions  relative  to their 
European  counterparts.  In  the  end,  national  treat- 
ment  prevailed,  although  there  have  been  repeated 
urgings  that  American  banking  laws  be  reformed  to 
give  European  banks  the  same  access  to  the 
American  market  as  American  banks  now  have  to 
the  European  market.5 
EFFECTSONBANKSTRUCTURE 
As  of  the  end  of June  1990,  there  were  12,321 
banks  operating  in  the  United  States.  Because  of 
mergers,  consolidations,  and  failures,  this  number  is 
widely  expected  to  fall even  if the  current  laws  on 
branching  remain  in effect.  Interstate  branching  may 
cause  the  number  to fall still more.  What  is not  clear 
is how  much  interstate  branching  will contribute  to 
the  fall in  the  number  of  banks. 
The  obvious  candidates  for  consolidation  are,  of 
course,  the  bank  subsidiaries  of  interstate  bank 
holding  companies.  At the  time  of this  writing  there 
are  160 interstate  bank  holding  companies  operating 
at least  46.5 bank  subsidiaries  in  different  states.  If 
the  law is changed  to allow interstate  subsidiaries  to 
be  consolidated  into  branches,  and  assuming  all 
interstate  bank  holding  companies  decide  to  con- 
solidate,  then  the  number  of  separately  chartered 
banks  in the  United  States  could  fall by at least  305. 
And  assuming  that  regional  restrictions  on interstate 
banking  are  removed,  the  number  could  fall  even 
more  by means  of end-to-end  mergers  between  banks 
that  had  been  restricted  to  separate  regional  com- 
pacts  such  as  those  in  the  Southeast  and  New 
England. 
At  the  other  end  of the  spectrum,  in June  1990 
there  were  11,724  small  banks,  that  is,  banks  with 
$500  million of assets  or less.  The  effect of interstate 
branching  on  small  banks  would  ,largely  depend  on 
the  laws of the  various  states.  In  states  with  restric- 
tive  branching  laws,  it is reasonable  to  assume  that 
some  banks  have  remained  in  business  because  of 
the  laws and would  be absorbed  by another  organiza- 
tion  if  the  laws  were  liberalized.  So  if  interstate 
branching  were  enacted  in  such  a way  as  to  either 
override  state  branching  laws  or to  induce  states  to 
liberalize  their  branching  restrictions,  then  the 
number  of  small  banks  would  probably  fall. 
5 Such  calls  for  reform  routinelv  cite  the  McFadden  Act  as  an 
obstacle  to  foreign  bank  expansion.  See,  for  example,  “Time 
to Ooen  Non-EC  Markets.  Brittan  Tells  Bankers’  Grouo.”  BA!I~ 
Banking  Report,  February’lz,  1990;  and  “U.S.  Urged’to  End 
Banking  Barriers,”  AmeriGan Banker,  March  26,  1990. 
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might  be  little  if any  effect  on  the  number  of small 
banks.  For  example,  all states  in the  Fifth  Federal 
Reserve  District  allow statewide  branching.  Table  II 
shows  there  are  substantial  numbers  of banks  with 
$500  million  of  assets  or  less  in  each  of  the  Fifth 
District  States.  Except  perhaps  in  West  Virginia, 
which  did not  allow statewide  branching  until  1988, 
the  number  of small  banks  cannot  be  attributed  to 
branching  restrictions.  The  survival  of small  banks 
in  such  a legal  environment  suggests  that  the  vast 
majority  would  remain  in business  even  if interstate 
branching  were  permitted.  To  the  extent  that  reduc- 
tions  in  the  number  of small  banks  occur  in  states 
already  permitting  statewide  branching,  they  are 
likely  to  be  the  result  of  acquisitions  of  banks  in 
markets  previously  divided  by  state  lines. 
Another  way  to  consider  the  probable  effect  of 
interstate  branching  is to  take  the  number  of banks 
per  capita  for  countries  with  no  limitations  on 
branching  and  project  the  same  ratio  on  the  United 
States.  Canada,  for example,  has  eight  major  banks, 
of which  six operate  nationwide,  serving  its popula- 
tion of 26.3  million.  If the  United  States  had the  same 
ratio  of banks  to population,  it would  have  about  75 
banks,  of which  about  56 would  operate  nationwide. 
At first blush,  75 banks  (much  less 56) seems  small 
compared  with  the  current  12,321.  But  56  banks 
competing  with  each  other  in  markets  across  the 
United  States  does  not  seem  small,  especially  when 
one  realizes  that  the  vast  majority  of American  banks 
operate  in one  market.  Only  if the  56 banks  operated 
in separate,  balkanized  markets  would  there  be cause 
for  concern.  More  important,  even  if most  of  the 
l&32  1 were  to cease  to exist  as separate  firms,  they 
would  not  simply  vanish  into  thin  air.  Most  would 
likely  be  converted  into  branches  of  one  of  the 
nationwide  banks.  Consequently,  while  there  would 
be  fewer  banks  in  each  market  there  would  not 
necessarily  be  fewer  banking  facilities. 
But  Canada  might  not  provide  a  relevant  com- 
parison.  First,  Canadian  banking  policy  differs  from 
that  of  the  United  States  in  that  it  has  been  and 
remains  a strictly  federal  function  despite  the  prov- 
inces’  high  degree  of autonomy  in other  areas  (such 
as  securities  regulation).  Unlike  the  United  States, 
there  was  no conflict  between  the  provinces  and  the 
federal  government  over  banking  structure.  Second, 
while banking  policy  in the  United  States  has at times 
encouraged  the  spread  of  small,  local  banks,  Ca- 
nadian  policy  seems  to  have  favored  larger  banks. 
Specifically,  while  in  the  United  States  in  1900  a 
Table  II 
Banks  with  Assets  below  $500  Million 
Fifth  Federal  Reserve  District 
Number  of  Banks  below 
State  Banks  $500  Million 
Maryland  108  96 
North  Carolina  78  68 
South  Carolina  84  78 
Virginia  180  168 
West  Virginia  162  159 
District  of  Columbia  26  20 
Source:  Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income,  June  1990. 
national  bank  could  be  chartered  with  as  little  as 
$25,000  in  capital,  in  Canada  the  Bank  Act  of 
1871  required  a  minimum  of  $500,000  in  capital 
(Breckenridge  1910). 
Finally,  a  structural  outcome  similar  to  the  Ca- 
nadian  system  is unlikely  because  small banks  in the 
United  States  may have  advantages  over  entrants  into 
their  markets  simply  by  virtue  of being  there  first. 
If a larger  bank  wishes  to enter,  it has  to incur  costs 
to  buy  its  way  in  either  de  novo  or  by  acquiring 
the  incumbent.  If the  incumbent  is  earning  above 
normal  returns,  the  costs  of  entry  might  be  worth 
incurring.  But  if the  incumbent  is  simply  earning  a 
normal  return,  the  entrant  would  have  to  have  an 
advantage  over  the  incumbent  in order  to  make  the 
costs  of entry  worth  incurring.  The  advantage  could 
occur  on  the  supply  side  in  the  form  of  more  effi- 
cient  operations,  or on the  demand  side  in the  form 
of enhanced  services  and credit  availability that  would 
make  consumers  willing  to  pay  more.  The  point  is 
that  the  eventual  structure  of American  banking  will 
depend  to  a large  extent  on  the  structure  that  is in 
place  now  and  will  not  inevitably  converge  to  that 
of  Canada. 
A  more  realistic  comparison  might  be  with  Cali- 
fornia,  which  has  explicitly  allowed  branching  since 
1909.  California  has  431  banks  serving  its  29.1 
million  population.  The  California  banks  per  capita 
ratio applied  to the  entire  United  States  implies  about 
3,700  banks.  Still,  such  projections  are  precarious 
because  they  do  not  take  into  account  advantages 
of incumbent  banks  in markets.  At best,  they  repre- 
sent  an  upper  limit  to  what  one  might  expect  to 
happen.  Given  the  divergence  between  the  number 
of  banks  predicted  by  the  ratios  for  Canada  and 
California,  the  only  prediction  one  can  safely  make 
is that  the  number  of banks  in the  United  States  will 
fall  but  not  by  much. 
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the  number  of banks  implied  by the  ratio  for Califor- 
nia or even  for Canada  were  to  come  to pass.  What 
would  be  the  implications  for  consumer  welfare?  A 
rough  idea  of  the  answer  may  be  inferred  from  a 
simulation  of the  potential  for mergers  in local bank- 
ing markets  in the  United  States  (Burke  1984).  The 
analysis  simulated  the  maximum  extent  of concen- 
tration  and  minimum  number  of firms  remaining  in 
a  market  after  the  consummation  of  all  possible 
mergers  that  did not violate the Department  of Justice 
Merger  Guidelines.  6 No  matter  how  many  banks  a 
market  started  with,  the  number  of  banks  remain- 
ing in the market  after all mergers  were  consummated 
averaged  from  four  to  six,  assuming  no  entry  from 
out-of-market  competitors  or de novo  banks.  In some 
markets,  the  number  could  fall as low as three  before 
triggering  an  antitrust  challenge. 
The  implication  of  the  simulation  results  is  that 
the  number  could  fall substantially  within  most  local 
markets  before  constituting  undue  concentration 
under  the  Department  of Justice  Merger  Guidelines. 
Thus  it could  be  that  the  56  nationwide  banks  sug- 
gested  by  the  analogy  with  Canada  might  be  more 
than  sufficient  to  preserve  competition.  Even  if all 
56  banks  do  not  overlap  in  all  markets,  it  is  only 
necessary  that  some  overlap  in each  market.  So long 
as one  accepts  the  Guidelines  as a valid  delineation 
of levels  of concentration  that  might  harm  consumer 
welfare,  one  may  infer  that  there  is plenty  of room 
for  consolidation  before  the  number  of  banks  falls 
to levels  with  which  regulators  should  be  concerned. 
Having  considered  the  banks  likely  to be  affected 
by  interstate  branching  powers,  the  possible  results 
of consolidation,  and  the  implications  for  competi- 
tion,  one  question  remains:  How  likely  are  bank 
holding  companies  to consolidate  their  subsidiaries? 
One  way  to  predict  the  likelihood  of consolidation 
if interstate  branching  laws  are  liberalized  is to look 
at the  experience  of bank  holding  companies  in states 
that  have  liberalized  their  branching  laws,  since 
they  would  provide  a situation  analogous  to the repeal 
of  McFadden.  At  least  one  case  study  of  Virginia 
showed  that  when  state  branching  restrictions  were 
liberalized,  the  majority  of banks  converted  their  sub- 
sidiary  banks  to  branches  (Kyrus  1982). 
6 According  to the  guidelines,  mergers  in unconcentrated  markets 
(Herfindahl  index  below  1000) would  not  be  challenged,  those 
in moderately  concentrated  markets  (Herfindahl  index  between 
1000  and  1800)  might  be  challenged  if they  raised  the  Herfin- 
dahl  by  at  least  100  points,  and  those  in  highly  concentrated 
markets  (Herfindahl  index  above  1800)  might  be  challenged  if 
they  raised  the  index  by  at  least  50  points  (Feder/  Register, 
June  29,1984). 
More  generally,  Table  III  is  a contingency  table 
showing  the  frequency  of consolidated  and  decen- 
tralized  banks  by  size  class  in  a  sample  of  twelve 
states  that  have  adopted  statewide  branching 
sometime  during  the  last  twenty  years.7  As  the 
analysis  of an earlier  section  implied,  the  larger  the 
bank  holding  company,  the  more  likely  it is to  con- 
solidate  its  subsidiaries  into  branches.  Indeed,  that 
is  exactly  what  the  frequencies  in  each  column  of 
Table  III  imply.  The  purpose  of  the  analysis  is  to 
test  whether  the  tendency  to  consolidate  is statisti- 
cally  independent  of  size,  since  it  is  mostly  larger 
organizations  that  operate  on an interstate  level  and 
might  therefore  be  likely  to take  advantage  of inter- 
state  branching  authority. 
The  strength  of the  association,  measured  as a x2 
statistic,  just  fails  the  test  of  statistical  significance 
at the  5 percent  level  of confidence.  Thus  while  the 
numbers  in the  contingency  table  point  to an increas- 
ing percentage  of consolidation  as organization  size 
grows,  the  relationship  is not  strong  in  a statistical 
sense.  As  a result,  the  experience  of bank  holding 
companies  within  states  that  have  liberalized  their 
branching  laws  does  not  provide  a strong  basis  for 
predicting  that  all interstate  bank  holding  companies 
will  automatically  convert  their  subsidiaries  to 
branches  if the  law  so  allows,  at  least  in  the  short 
term.  Despite  the  compelling  arguments  for  con- 
solidation  of  subsidiaries  into  branches,  there  are 
apparently  sufficient  benefits  to  decentralization  to 
make  the  outcome  vary  widely  across  companies. 
7 The  states  are  Florida,  Louisiana,  Massachusetts,  Michigan, 
New  Jersey,  New  York,  Ohio,  Oklahoma,  Tennessee,  Texas, 
Virginia,  and  West  Virginia.  Bank  holding  companies  with 
combined  bank  assets  of less than  $1 billion are excluded  in order 
to  limit  the  sample  to  companies  with  statewide  operations 
instead  of  operations  limited  to  one  local  area. 
Table  III 
Consolidation  vs.  Decentralization 
Banks  Larger  than  $1  Billion  in  Assets 
$1-5  $5-10  Over  $10  Row 
Billion  Billion  Billion  Total 
Branches  25  13  25  63 
(46.30%)  (59.09%)  (71.43%) 
Subsidiaries  29  9  10  48 
(53.70%)  (40.91%)  (28.57%) 
Column  Total  54  22  35  111 
Summary  statistics:  $  =  5.526  (Critical  x1,os,2  .,r,  =  5.99) 
Note:  Numbers  in  parentheses  denote  column  frequencies. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  15 There  are some  qualifications  to the  results.  First, 
most  of the  decentralized  bank  holding  companies 
are  operating  in  states  that  have  liberalized  their 
branching  restrictions  in  the  last  five  years,  for 
example,  Michigan,  Ohio,  and Texas.  Second,  at the 
time  of this w&g  there  appears  to be a trend  toward 
consolidation  that  may  not  yet  have  ‘finished.  For 
example,  five of the  bank  holding  companies  in the 
sample  announced  or completed  consolidations  since 
June  1990.  As a result,  the numbers  may reflect  more 
consolidation  over  time,  especially  among  the  larger 
organizations.  Finally,  consolidation  seems  irrevers- 
ible,  since  there  are  apparently  no  cases  of  con- 
solidated  banks  that  elected  to  spin  off  branches 
into  subsidiaries.  The  implication  of  the  qualifica- 
tions  is that  at this time  the  contingency  tables  might 
not  yet  reflect  long-run  results. 
CONCLUDINGCOMMENTS 
The  liberalization  of  geographical  restraints  on 
banking  and  other  depository  institutions  has  been 
a prominent  feature  of banking  in the  United  States 
since  the  failures  of the  late  1920s  and  early  1930s. 
The  liberalization  has  picked  up  momentum  during 
the  198Os,  during  which  barriers  fell to  both  state- 
wide  branching  and interstate  bank  holding  company 
expansion.  Given  all  that  has  happened,  it  would 
seem  logical  for the  next  step  to  be  to  relax  restric- 
tions  on  branching  across  state  lines. 
Despite  the  arguments  in  favor  of  interstate 
branching,  it  is  not  likely  that  permitting  it  would 
immediately  revolutionize  the  banking  structure  of 
the  United  States;  Assuming  all  interstate,,  bank 
holding  companies  were  to consolidate,  the  number 
of large banks,  most  of which  do not combete  directly 
with  each  other,,  would  fall.  J3ut  while  interstate 
branching  could  lead  to  some  interstate  expansion 
that  had not  occurred  before,  it would  not  likely have 
much  effect  on  the  number  of small  banks,  at least 
those  that  have  survived  the  competition  in  states 
with liberal branching  laws. And given that  some  bank 
holding  companies  have  chosen  to  retain  a  decen- 
tralized  structure  within  their  states,  it is possible  that 
some  interstate  organizations  could  remain  decen- 
tralized  as  well. 
Still,  a long-term  benefit  of permitting  interstate 
branching  is  that  .it  could  pave  the  way  for  the 
development  of a truly  nationwide  banking  system 
with  geographically  diversified  lending  and  funding 
sources.  Since  interstate  branching  would  enable 
interstate  organizations  to operate  at lower  cost  than 
under  the  current  system,  it  could  facilitate  the 
development  of  expertise  in  interstate  operations. 
While  nationwide  organizations  might  not  develop 
immediately  because  of capital constraints,and  limited 
knowledge  of markets  outside  of banks’  local  areas, 
the  ability  to expand  in a sound  manner  will increase 
as bankers’become  accustomed  to operating  branch 
networks  over  wider  areas.  In  the  end,  the  result 
could  be  a mixture  of large  banks  with  nationwide 
branch  networks  and  markets  and  smaller  banks 
specializing  in  local  markets. 
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